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---------------
Exploring the neural correlates of consciousness presents three kinds of challenges. The first 
one has to do with the difficult notion of a neural- or of a cerebral - realization of a function. 
Although everyone agrees that every mental function supervenes on the activity of some part of 
the brain, some indeterminacy  may arise on the kind of supervenience basis that is to be looked 
for. A common view is that every mental function, even highly modular ones, only operates on the 
background of other mental functions, or cerebral systems. Therefore when one looks for neural 
correlates of any particular function, one has to differentiate those neural  or brain properties that 
are identifiable as directly correlated to that function from those that are only indirectly correlated 
to it.  In other words, there are two ways of understanding the neural correlation of a mental state 
to  a  cerebral state. In the stronger sense, such a correlation should be both necessary and 
sufficient. The causal entanglement of cerebral functions makes such a demand implausible. 
What can be looked for is at most a weaker kind of correlation : only on the background of a 
normally functioning brain, can some particular neural states be associated with particular mental 
properties. In the case of interest here, the effort at locating the supervenience basis of  
consciousness in one definite well-circumscribed center is at odds with the notion that conscious 
states are information-processing states, using widely distributed data analyses and retrieval.
The second challenge consists in specifying what the term "consciousness" is supposed to 
refer to. As Block (1995) shows convincinly, several different concepts are often confused under 
this word. Phenomenal consciousness  refers to experiential states, like seeing green or feeling a 
pain. Access-consciousness  has to do with the rational control of speech and behavior. While 
phenomenal states have a non-conceptual content, access-consciousness involves inference, 
and thus conceptual content.
This second challenge is made still more difficult when one realizes that conscious states of 
both categories (phenomenal and inferential) might be related to a specific function which itself 
depends both on  implicit (unconscious) and on explicit learning, i.e. attention.  Attention cannot 
itself be identified with some conscious state, because if it  helps determine which kinds of 
contents will be made phenomenally salient and inferentially promiscuous, it cannot without 
circularity be itself triggered by phenomenally and inferentially salient features of incoming or 
stored data1. 
The third challenge consists in a well-known, venerable set of worries linked to the fact that 
after all, there is nothing that we can tell about the causal connection between some neural 
activation - more generally, some physical structure - and a particular phenomenal quality. 
Shepard (1995) gives an interesting twist to the problem. Given that non-human animals cannot 
report on their internal states, how are we to establish in any principled way what kind of 
organism can enjoy conscious states ? Neither would the very ability to report subjective feelings 
and experiences, as displayed by humans, suffice to establish that consciousness emerges at 
the agent-level.  Does then the ability to have conscious experiences depend on complexity  in 
the underlying system ? Is this a holistic capacity, or is there an emergent qualitative property at 
the level, say, of the neuron or of the neuron assembly ?
However laden which conceptual difficulties, these  problems cannot be articulated and solved 
without relying on scientific inquiry. Folk psychology is a dubious adviser in such a task, which 
consists in part in understanding the very possibility of folk psychology. One way to circumvent 
suggestions from folk psychology  is to concentrate on the data of mental pathology. This 
domain, poorly described and understood by ordinary psychology, offers interesting correlations 
between functional alterations and perturbations of consciousness. 
We will concentrate below on the subjective impression associated to the notion that one is the 
actor of one's own acts. Taking the subjective lead, we will try to look for a functional basis and 
for a neural correlate for this "feeling in charge". Although it is a platitude to say that one did 
something on the basis of one's own intention to act, it is not all that clear how an action is 
actually planned and executed, how a subject becomes conscious of intending, acting, and 
having completed the action, and how far prior or occurrent conscious states are necessary for 
the whole process to develop. Studying a pathological case, where a patient may  either 
misattribute some action as being his own, or, on the contrary, disavow being the actor of  a 
particular action -  claiming  that a foreign influence had him move-, should shed some light on 
the relationships between   functional data, subjective reports of agency or loss thereof, and 
neural correlates. Schizophrenia offers such cases.
The clinical symptoms of schizophrenia include disturbances in visual experience, blocking 
phenomena, specific problems in speech production, speech understanding and thought control. 
The patients often have delusions of control (they see themselves as endowed with specific, 
more or less extensive  powers over other people) or delusions of reference ( other people in the 
street have something particular to communicate with the patients). A significant proportion of 
patients experience hallucinations, in general (verbal-) auditive, haptic, or olfactory.  They also 
experience a number of difficulties related to action, also called "executive" difficulties. These  
perturbations are manifest both in the subjective reports issued by the patients, and in their 
results in executive tests such as the Tower of London, or the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. 
Being requested to tell how it all started, a patient gives the following account : "I get shaky in 
the knees and my chest is like a mountain in front of me, and my body actions are different. The 
arms and legs are apart and away from me, and they go on their own. That's when I feel I am the 
other person and copy their movements, or else stop and stand like a statue. I have to stop to 
find out whether my hand is in my pocket or not... Sometimes the legs walk on  by themselves or 
sometimes I let my arms roll to see where they will land." (Chapman, 1966). 
From the mosaic of reported perturbations in the domain of  action, emerge a sense of imposed 
actions, of being subject to a foreign will, or conversely, of exerting influence on others; a 
disposition to copy others without preestablished intention of doing so, and a relative difficulty at 
resisting impulses triggered by contextual cues. 
If we want to contrast the levels of analysis of the awareness of agency in these disorders, it is 
important to insist that this way of summarizing the clinical evidence is shaped by covert 
functional hypotheses, which will be made explicit below. A patient normally couches his own 
experience in qualitative, holistic terms, involving not only a change in his own mind, but a brutal 
change in the external world as well as in several of his bodily functions. Delusions can be seen 
as normal inferences from puzzling  new experiences, on the background of an existing system of 
beliefs. Any systematic change in the quality of perception can receive a subjective explanation  
in epistemic and motivational terms with a considerable impact on the subject's apprehension of 
his world and of his own role in it. 
 The description I just gave of the schizophrenic syndrom is compatible with a functional 
hypothesis, according to which the disease would be in part constituted by a perturbed 
monitoring of action.  By action monitoring, is understood a set of complementary operations 
such as instigating an action in the correct time and place, exerting a  feedback control on the 
movement towards the goal or target event, stopping the movement when goal is reached, or 
when crucial preconditions fail to be met. 
Before we examine various ways of articulating this hypothesis, we need to define an action. 
Following neuroscientists as well as philosophers sensitive to the issue of animal psychology2, an 
action should be defined not on the basis of its source (in terms of relevant beliefs and desires) 
but as a process that develops from an internal model towards a goal with an appropriately 
monitored execution. In other words, feedback is the central notion for an action : a movement 
has to be  guided in an internally  controlled way up to  goal attainment to be called an action. In 
this view on action, the source of the action, i.e. the actual cause that triggers it, may be external 
as well as internal. The fact that an action can be carried out consciously or not, in an automatic 
or in a deliberate way, is also an extrinsic property of action, that does not need to enter its 
definition. As a consequence, one can also, at least as a matter of conceptual distinctions, 
separate control of an action from conscious access to control mechanisms. On the other hand, 
an essential ingredient  consists in a comparator, through which a system can modify the currents 
step towards the goal as a function of the difference between observed and predicted output. 
According to an influent theory (Frith, 1992), many of the clinical data reported above, besides 
the openly executive symptoms, result indeed from difficulties in processes related to the 
monitoring of action. Within this general framework, Christopher Frith has an interesting strategy 
for explaining schizophrenic symptoms. The first step consists in widening the executive 
hypothesis in such a way that it encompasses action proper as well as the mental activity related 
to action. The second step consists in extending still further the hypothesis,  by considering the 
previous perturbations as special cases of an overarching metarepresentational capacity. Let us 
examine these two steps in turn.
From Monitoring actions  to monitoring   intentions and self
  In schizophrenia, both the monitoring of action and the monitoring of the intentions to act 
would be disturbed (Frith, 1992, p. 81). Positive symptoms, such as  delusion of control or verbal-
auditive hallucinations, would be explained by an inability to distinguish changes due to our own 
actions from changes due to external events. The  patient who hallucinates is seen as failing to 
recognize an  internal speech production as his own. Similarly,  in thought insertion, a patient is 
taken to be unable to recognize a thought as his own. 
Why would these failures occur ? Normally, any mental or physical activity is perceived as 
originating in self or in some external event thanks to the information carried by a dedicated 
signal, telling whether a movement was effected by the individual ; when absent, the system 
would interpret a movement as unwilled, as when the body  is passively subjected to some 
external force.  The relevant signal is supposed to help compare reafferent signals with the 
signals that are expected on the basis of the current willed action. It has been suggested that 
such a signal would be delivered by a mechanism underlying  active perceptual activitities, named 
corollary discharge, (Sperry, 1950) or efferent copy (von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950). Although it is 
only hypothetical at this stage of our knowledge of brain functions, such a mechanism is required 
to explain, for example, how ocular saccades can be taken into account and neutralized in 
interpreting visual input. When no such efferent copy signal is produced (one is sitting in a train), 
it is much more difficult to say whether oneself is moving or whether the perceived scene is. In our 
conscious sense of agency, a major component would thus consist in the sense of effort which is 
the subjective correlate of the corollary discharge of any action.
Granted that a sense of effort is responsible for being aware that one acts, why  not suppose 
that a similar subjective sense allows knowing that one thinks? To give his hypothesis a wider 
scope,  Frith suggests that the very same "sense of effort" could be present when a thought is 
produced. A loss of such a  (thought- or action-related)  sense of effort would issue  either in an 
experience of thought insertion or of externally controlled action. In the case of ordinary 
thoughts, it is plausible that thoughts that one does not identify as one's own are taken to be 
alien, inserted thoughts. Being a particular kind of thought, an intention to act could thus be 
misattributed as somebody else's intention to act.
These intriguing hypotheses have already received partial support from clinical and 
experimental data. In particular, the difficulty in monitoring one's own actions is experimentally 
testable, through standard executive tests such as WCST, or through specific tasks, such as the 
ability to correct videogame motor responses used by Frith & Done (1989)3. Schizophrenic 
patients with passivity experiences (delusions of control and thought insertion) are shown to be 
abnormally impaired in a motor correction task when they are not provided with visual feedback 
on their own actions. Using the theoretical apparatus summarized above, the idea is that, while 
normal subjects can use  central  "efference copy" signals to compare the actual with the 
expected output  of their actions,  schizophrenics seem not to be able to produce or at least to 
use these signals. Being unaware of their own intentions, they will experience their actions as 
having an external agent. This inference is based on an incorrect memory of the type of action 
effected. The delusion of control thus expresses a defect in self-monitoring.
Problems of monitoring and metarepresentational deficits
Frith (1992, 1994) suggests that the disorders described above, affecting both self-monitoring 
and the monitoring of intentions, could after all express deeper-rooted problems, having to do 
with the very structure of conscious experience. His argument develops both on  conceptual and 
empirical grounds. Conceptually, Frith relies on what philosophers call a "higher-order theory of 
conscious states"4. To be consciously looking at a tree, for example, you must form the thought 
representing the fact that you look at a tree, and hence, you must form a metarepresentation of 
your looking at a tree. If metarepresentation is crucial for self-awareness, then people having 
problems with metarepresenting states (their own or the others'states) should have problems with 
self-consciousness as well as with interpreting other people's mental states.
Empirically, Frith proposes that what is disturbed is not only some kind of low-level mechanism 
(such as the efferent copy mechanism evoked above), but the very ability to recognize that one is 
in a certain mental state (intention or belief). This ability  could depend on a high-level, general-
purpose mechanism responsible for a large part of metarepresentational  performances. This 
system, first described by Shallice (1988), called the Supervisory Attentional System, (SAS) is the 
set of control functions  involved in non-routine, willed operations. In this model, pursuing a goal 
may be a matter of a routine that is performed by "contention scheduling". But representing this 
goal, i.e. making it the content of a conscious intention, is the duty of SAS. Thus, in the reading 
that Frith offers for Shallice's SAS, operation of the will is indeed dependent on self-
consciousness. In this reading,   a state of affairs  has to be represented as the content  of an 
intention, to be efficacious in guiding behavior. All willed action has therefore a 
metarepresentational structure. Deliberate intentional action implies that a connection between 
two representations is established : one for a primary condition (like "do X") , and one for the 
function that is allocated to the primary representation : intending, believing, knowing. (Frith, 
1992, 130)
To understand how metarepresentation could be instantiated in the brain, one should 
therefore, according to Frith, concentrate on the relationship between contention schedule and 
SAS : the first gives a primary information -- "do X" -- about a movement to be performed. Such 
an information can be understood as a first-order proposition, or as some representation 
activated in motor cortex. SAS then specifies what the function of the former proposition will be ; 
an additional brain representation interacting  with the former will thus allow forming the 
metarepresentation "I intend to do X". This additional structure could be different according to 
the kind of connection between the metarepresentation and its primary content. Looking at the 
relevant brain areas, it is found that tasks that require inhibition of prepotent responses involve 
the orbito-frontal lobe, whereas tasks requiring delayed-reponses would activate dorsolateral 
frontal areas. Prefrontal cortex, SMA (Supplementary Motor Area) and the basal ganglia would 
be in charge of the proper control of the use to which the primary content (represented in the 
relevant part of motor or temporal cortex) should be put (Frith, 1992, 130). 
Let us summarize. For Frith, monitoring one's actions presupposes a monitoring of one's own 
intentions, which in turn presupposes being conscious of having those intentions. For example, 
the fact that rats can monitor their own actions ipso facto indicates that these animals "have 
some kind of self-awareness" (Frith, 1992, 131). In this metarepresentational framework, 
schizophrenic symptoms result from the underlying disorder in the ability to metarepresent mental 
states, both in the self and in other people. In auditory hallucination, a patient hears a voice and 
does not recognize it as his own for lack of a self-attribution ; in  reference delusion   the patient 
makes incorrect inferences about the intentions of other people. : he misattributes a mental state 
to someone who does not have it. A patient with a delusion of  influence does not recognize his 
own intentions and takes them to be somebody else's.
 Frith's model thus sees schizophrenia as lying on a continuum with a developmental disorder 
such as autism.  Autistic children present a perturbation in understanding of mental states in 
themselves and others, as is shown by their specific difficulty in solving the false belief task. To 
succeed at such a task,  one must take the point of view of someone else on a situation even 
though the corresponding belief  is false (outdated). Let us suppose that  an autistic child 
watches the following scene : a toy  is removed from where   child A has put it  when A is out of 
the room. Now let us ask the following question to the autistic child : where will A look for his toy ? 
An autistic child - as well as a normal child under 3/4 - will attribute to A a piece of knowledge that 
he acquired himself , but that A fails to have. According to the "theory theory" of mind, favored by 
Frith, autistic children fail the false belief task because they  are unable to metarepresent states, 
which in turn expresses the impairment  of a specialized module, the theory of mind module.  In 
contradistinction with autistic patients, schizophrenic patients, according to Frith, did have access 
to this module during  their earlier life, but become unable to use it. Such a disorder would affect 
their present performance at representing  various kinds of mental states : their own goals 
(grandiosity, unrealistic goal attribution), their own intentions  (delusions of control, thought 
insertion) as well as the goals and intentions of others  (persecution, verbal-auditory 
hallucination). (Frith, 1994, 156)
Discussion
There are several methodological objections that can be addressed to this type of theory, 
understood as a common explanation for autism and schizophrenia.  Before such an innate 
theory of mind module is postulated, - or in general, before one tries to understand a symptom in 
terms of some higher-level functional hypothesis -  one should  first investigate which  lower-level 
processes  might jointly result in the ability to understand mental facts.  In autism, it may be that 
affects fail to be perceived and recognized by the baby, which in turn would prevent him/her to 
extract the relevant information for categorising internal states5. Another possibility would be a 
specific deficit in memorizing motor imagery or in imitating6, or in inhibiting prepotent stimuli7. In 
schizophrenia, disorders in metarepresentation may also be derivative on  an executive disorder, 
linked to a deficit in working memory , or to an attentional disorder. 
Another objection has to do with the very notion of explanation in psychiatry. When a 
pathological symptom is to be explained, it is not informative to invoke a  hypothetical 
corresponding function whose alleged disorder causes the symptom. What is needed is an 
independent proof of the existence of the "new" function,  in particular of the information  used 
and on the processor using it8. In all cases, it must be shown that the disturbances in the known 
functions cannot account for the symptom. It must also be demonstrated that the symptom as 
described forms a "natural class", i.e. that its defining properties help determining a common 
causal structure. In the particular case of Frith's theory, it is unclear  why two different kinds of 
explanation are offered for the same class of symptoms. One is, as we saw, that a patient does 
not have a proper corollary discharge mechanism allowing him to know what action he has 
performed. He has therefore not a conceptual problem with his own intentions, but only a 
content-identification problem. The other is, according to the modular view, that a schizophrenic 
patient fails to master intentional concepts ; his module for a theory of mind is impaired. In this 
case the patient does not know what belief is, and commits mistakes on contents in a derivative 
way (i.e., because he has an inadequate understanding of what a belief, a desire, an intention 
should be). Each explanation - the lower-level theory of efference copy, and the higher-level 
modular theory of mentalization - seems to preempt the other.
Claiming that a particular module has the effect of performing some particular  cognitive task 
clearly does not suffice establishing that this module does in fact exist independently from other 
functions, in particular that it uses specific inputs, and delivers specific outputs, in the fast, 
automatic, and informationally  encapsulated way associated to the very concept of module9.  
Now how can the existence of a module be established ? Developmental data  do suggest  
constraints on functional links, but do not by themselves speak in favor of a particular  mental 
architecture.  By contrast, neurological data may support modular claims, because they let the 
possibility of identifying cerebrally  and functionally identified  areas  through the method of 
double-dissociation10. 
From a philosophical point of view, Frith's approach exemplifies a theory in which consciousness 
is taken to be a mental function alongside with other functions such as language, perception or 
action planning. Whether  self-awareness is explained through the SAS model, or through a 
modular mechanism such as the theory of mind module, in both cases it is suggested that the 
brain has specialized mechanisms for becoming aware of mental facts allowing the subject to 
know  not only what he believes, but also that he has beliefs. Mental pathology  would thus 
reflect the fact that mental information failed to be processed. 
Also, although this point is often left implicit, it is presupposed in this view that the mechanisms 
for self-awareness are also those responsible for self-identity. There are several arguments to be 
offered against such an assimilation. If consciousness about one's own states is distributed at 
many different levels - such as memory, perception, action -, it may be more questionable to 
identify the acquisition of a concept of a self with the various types of conscious states emerging 
from monitoring the various kinds of internal information. Data from animal psychology  prevent an 
assimilation between elementary reflexive states such as these with the building blocks of the 
concept of a self. Research in the corollary discharge  in the fruit fly never tackled the concept of 
an emergent fly-selfhood. To detect who did the action requests a  restricted answer, in terms of 
a GO-NOGO type of switch. No decision on personal identity is involved in agency attribution, 
although conversely there can be no personal identity without a capacity for anwering  who-
questions.
Self-awareness may therefore alternatively be understood as emerging from underlying 
functional processes that mediate in specific cases consciously accessible or reportable outputs. 
In this perspective, conscious states may occur in a variety of mental functions without having to 
be dealt with separately, in the sense that their being conscious makes them functionally special. 
As Rizzolatti  (1994) emphasizes, "motor preparation is not a category of neural operations 
("unconscious" ) opposed to another category of neural operations ("conscious"), but rather a 
term which describes the effect that some neural operations may have on motor responses 
regardless of whether or not they are conscious". This view on consciousness is of a radically 
different kind from the view described above, where self-awareness and awareness of others is 
entirely realized at the theory-of-mind level and seems to emerge at a very late stage in 
phylogeny.
It is worth exploring  a theory that purports to explain the symptoms of schizophrenia listed 
above in a more parsimonious way , i.e. in terms of lower-level mechanisms that may indeed have 
far-reaching effects on the system of beliefs and of motivations of the disturbed patient. This 
theory, developed by Marc Jeannerod and his collaborators, tries as Frith's theory  to understand 
the altered conscious states in deluded patients in terms of a monitoring of action deficit. 
Interestingly, this theory also has relevance to explain part  of the autistic syndroms, without 
having to hypothesize a disturbed module for the theory of mind mechanism. I will present this 
theory in my own terms, hoping that, in its core, it is faithful to  Jeannerod's general intentions.
Jeannerod's concept of action-awareness
 Frith's theory  paved the way for distinguishing various ways in which attributing a mental state 
may go wrong. Although he did make some of the crucial distinctions, he failed to provide a 
description of what the normal individual is able to perceive, and of what he has to infer. Let us 
then start by distinguishing at a conceptual level several types of attribution that may contribute 
to action-awareness. I will contrast agency awareness, goal awareness, and sensorimotor 
awareness. Agency awareness is typically a conscious realization that I -- or someone else -- did 
or did not perform an action. It is the state in which an organism finds itself when detecting his 
being active or passive in a particular situation. In particular, it is a state that is activated when 
interpreting input signals (afferences or reafferences) which in turn allow achieving a veridical 
perception of the environment. Goal awareness is the type of awareness that individuates the 
action through its intentional content. This dimension of action-awareness allows categorizing 
actions according to their adaptive meaning. It focusses on the motive that drives the execution 
of the corresponding action. Sensorimotor awareness  is related to the motor content of an 
action. It is the form of awareness that identifies an action through its dynamics, i.e. via the 
spatial and temporal properties of the bodily movement involved in the action.
Commonsense has it  that in a normal subject, these three forms of action-awareness are 
present in most types of action.  Here is the folk story : an agent forms the conscious intention to 
do X. He does X by way of moving in a Q way. He knows that he Qs to reach X (sensorimotor 
awareness). he knows that he wants to have X done (goal awareness). He knows that he and no 
one else did X  (agency awareness). 
Schizophrenic patients' difficulties with the monitoring of action may disturb this picture. For as 
we say earlier, a patient may do X without acknowledging that he was the agent of the action X  
("someone else made me act"); he may also do X without having a particular  conscious goal in 
doing X (this is a case of automatic or stimulus driven behavior, such as psychotic roaming or 
stripping clothes away in public; but this latter class of dissociations is problematic, for we saw 
earlier that a subject in such a case always finds a way to rationalize his action by making up a 
goal). Even folk psychologists have to admit that sensorimotor content offers a perplexing case. 
Although one usually  believes to be conscious of one's own motor activity, there are many cases 
in which one is unable not only to explain verbally how one does X, but also to do it "in the 
abstract", in the absence of the relevant contextual cues and  motivational pressures.
To provide a low-level theory of the schizophrenic symptoms listed above, it is necessary to 
explain how  the three components of action-awareness can be dissociated. Whereas Frith offers 
an explanation in terms of a metarepresentational disorder (what goes wrong is that the patient  
cannot form a mental representation of his own states), Jeannerod (in press) suggests that the 
problem stems from the representational structure of action : the  possibility of a pathological 
dissociation suggests that several subfunctions cooperate in a more or less independent way.  In 
its broad lines, the hypothesis advanced by Jeannerod is that, in the normal subject, a goal 
representation is in itself agent-neutral and coded in allocentric coordinates. Sensorimotor 
representations are  egocentrically coded, but short-lived;  activated mainly at a non-conscious 
level,  they are often not --or only poorly -- memorized when the action is completed. Agency 
representation is effected separately, through an inference based both on internal and on 
external cues. 
In this perspective, the schizophrenic symptoms have nothing to do with a specific disorder in 
metarepresentation. The altered conscious states may  appear at each functional level where 
signals are received and used to monitor action. If the signals used for controlling motor 
execution are not the same as those  used for generating a conscious judgment on the action, 
then subjects engaged in an action may have a poor conscious model of what they do, at least 
at the sensorimotor level. If the signals used in identifying a goal representation are different from 
those used in attributing  the action to oneself, then patients may have a conscious 
representation of the goal of an action while rejecting their role in executing it.
As Jeannerod's target article shows in detail11, various sources of data indicate that the same 
representational format is used to imagine, plan, memorize, prepare  the action and guide its 
execution. In the definition of action proposed earlier, to which Jeannerod subscribes, an action 
implies the existence of an internal model of the goal that guides the execution until completion. 
The internal, dynamical  model for a particular action can be run beforehand to test the viability of 
the action, in a simulatory way, or run on-line to guide the action. It can also be activated by the 
perception of some external performance of this very same action. This format can be called 
semantic,  if one understands under this term that the conditions of satisfaction of the action are 
couched in external, allocentric terms : the target-event of an action includes normally both the 
object on which the action is exerted and the final state of the organism in relation to this object. 
Therefore the  representation of the goal of an action  must code as well the dynamics of the 
action as a function of the properties of the target-object. This aspect of goal representation 
should rather  be called "pragmatic" (see Jeannerod 1994, 198) because it draws on the 
pragmatic information in visual cortex, devoted to the properties of objects relevant for action. 
The latter  are represented in the dorsal stream as "affordances", not as cues for symbolic 
categorization (represented in the ventral stream)12.
Consciousness of action is in this view intrinsically related to the representational format for 
action. The very awareness of an action being performed by the self, i.e.  motor imagery, is the 
subjective, felt correlate of the representation on which the execution relies, and is "functionally 
equivalent" to the representation used in preparing the action. A number of studies indeed show 
that mental imagery shares with the corresponding real action several key physiological 
correlates. For example heart rate, respiration rate, and end-tidal PCO2  are increased in imagery 
as they are in the corresponding preparations  of actions (Decety & al., 1991). Deliberate mental 
simulation of an action also activates motor pathways (Bonnet, Decety & al., 1997)  as well as the 
corresponding areas of the sensory motor cortex and Supplementary Motor Area (Roth, Decety & 
al., 1996). The wealth of data gathered about the neural correlates of action indicate that a 
common network of neurons is activated for all conditions involving action : intending, imitating, 
observing, preparing, observing : the inferior parietal lobule (area 40), the ventral preomotor area 
(ventral area 6) and part of SMA. This network could constitute  a general vocabulary of actions 
for all kinds of use. In addition, an overlap in dedicated areas can be observed between 
performing and simulating, simulating and observing, and finally performing and observing a 
particular action, which suggests close functional links between these activities.
Goal-representations are agent-neutral
Of particular interest for our schizophrenic symptoms is that one and the same representation 
can normally  be used to produce a goal-oriented  behavior or to recognize a behavior in 
someone else as being goal-oriented. It has been known for some time that neural assemblies in 
the superior temporal sulcus are involved in the recognition of specific movements  in other 
organisms (Perrett & al., 1989).  More recently, it was shown that neurons in F5, called "mirror-
neurons",  are able to respond both to visual stimuli of an action and to the production of 
movement by the self. A series of neural cell recordings in the macaque show that groups of 
neurons in the premotor cortex are activated both by a particular movement effected by another 
individual - animal or human - and by the active performance of the same movement (Di 
Pellegrino & al., 1992, Rizzolatti & al., 1996, Gallese & al., 1996).  These mirror- neurons respond 
only  when  the observed agent acts on an object; they do not fire when the agent mimes an 
action in the absence of an object, or when only the object is presented. Transcranial magnetic 
stimulation of the motor cortex (Fadiga & al., 1995) and PET studies on normal human subjects 
observing someone grasping objects (Rizzolatti & al., 1996) suggest that the same kinds of 
neurons are present in homologous areas of the humain brain (Broca's area). The presence of 
mirror neurons in this cerebral  area might give an additional plausibility to the motor theory of 
speech defended by Liberman (1996).
According to Jeannerod, the discovery of mirror-neurons suggests that goal-representations 
may be at some level agent-independent. Becoming conscious of an action such as grasping or 
walking does not involve first identifying an agent, then specifying its current activity. It relies on 
the activation of a representation that is neutral as to the agent. Before we get to the question of 
how to proceed from goal identification to agent identification , let us examine more closely the 
sensorimotor content of an action.
Recognizing the sensorimotor content of an action
How far is a normal subject conscious of the dynamics of his own actions ? One way of 
ascribing an action to oneself could consist in relying on the internal model activated in the 
course of the execution. A decisive argument for such a claim would be that subjects have 
access to an accurate internal  information on what kind of movement they have done. By 
"internal" is meant here the central or proprioceptive dynamics of the action, also called "internal 
feedback", as contrasted with the external feedback provided by visual reafferences. 
Recent work by Fourneret & Jeannerod (1998; in press) indicates that normal subjects as well 
as schizophrenic patients, have a poor access to the internal model of the movement they have 
effected. When they are deprived from accurate visual feedback, and are instead given spurious 
visual reafferences on the course of their actions, they are quite unable to identify the actual 
movement they have produced. Their conscious sense of their own movement in space seems to 
be overwhelmed by the visual cues that are provided, even though these cues grossly depart 
from the actual direction of the movement. This result is coherent with experimental evidence 
concerning the lack of awareness of subjects having to adjust their movements for grasping an 
object  to a sudden jump of the target. (Goodale, Pélisson & Prablanc, 1986). Again, the signals 
used in generating  or correcting an action seem to depart from the signals used in forming a 
conscious judgement on which  sensorimotor sequence occurred. It seems that subjects have to 
use external cues to consciously identify the sensorimotor content of their own actions, whereas 
they can rely on internal cues to make the necessary adjustments in an unconscious and 
automatic way. 
Let us pause to observe the contrast between rehearsing  the sensorimotor content of a past 
action and planning to act according to a particular sensorimotor content. While a subject can 
memorize quite well, and produce mental imagery, for sensorimotor contents that he plans to 
execute, he is quite unable to reactivate the mental imagery of a sensorimotor content for a past 
action when the latter has  been produced as a response to contextual cues. I do know how to 
cut a piece of cake, or how to press an orange. But how did I grasp this object while it was falling 
? How did I manage not to slide on the icy pavement ? These constrasts suggest that conscious 
access to one's sensorimotor content of action requires two types of additional conditions relative 
to simple use of that content in ordinary learning tasks. First, that there are public, allocentric 
features to ground the sensorimotor  judgment. As we will see below, this could indicate that 
conscious experience of verbally reportable experiences are functionally dependent on  coding 
public, shared features of the environment.   Second, that the action features need to be 
controlled on line. Mental imagery does occur in cases of careful motor preparation or execution. 
It does not need to occur in routine tasks. Once an action is executed, its sensorimotor content is 
rapidly erased from consciously accessible memory.
Judging  who
One of the misleading intuitions about  agency attribution consists in  taking  mental imagery to 
provide a complete picture of an action, including  the agent, the target event, and the 
instrumental behavior. According to this intuition, everyone would have a direct impression on 
who does what in the content of his own mental imagery. "This action feels like mine", in this 
view, means that  "I have the current experience of moving this particular way, and I see it 
happening in my own sphere, so to speak, i.e. within my reach". "That action does not feel like 
mine" would conversely mean that "it happens outside my sphere, without my reach, and with no 
associated phenomenal awareness".
This intuition is challenged by the dissociations articulated above, between the three levels of 
action representation: the goal-content, the sensorimotor content, and the agency content are 
three different kinds of information, which need different procedures for being correctly extracted 
and used, and which provide different (if any) conscious experiences. Let us suppose that you 
are  watching a soccer game on TV : you may well share a large part of  the phenomenology  of 
the active player. As you work at identifying particular goal-contents, you form various mental 
images of the smart moves to perform, and may even feel "I can make it". This empathy does not 
help locating the true agent; it makes the solution more difficult to find. Although there is 
obviously a difference in neuronal activation when one looks at one action and when one 
performs it (in the latter case only, your brain launches the action, and receives feedback of both 
the internal and the external varieties), there is no exact mapping, as we saw, between our 
representational states on the one hand, and our conscious phenomenology and  agency 
attributions on the other hand. 
One practical, although by no means infaillible way of finding out who the agent is, seems to be 
to identify where the action took place. If something happens within your reach in the right 
temporal sequence, then you  may safely infer that you are the agent for the action you have 
individuated.  You are at home sitting in your armchair and not on a soccer field, and there is no 
ball around. This is (partly) how you know that you did not score a goal. 
If this is true, one way of testing the ability of a subject to determine whether or not he is the 
agent of a particular action consists in providing  him an ambiguous visual feedback about the 
spatial and temporal properties of his actions, in a context where agency attributions cannot be  
easily inferred. This can be done using an experimental paradigm in which the subject looks at 
his own gloved hand behind a transparent screen. What he considers as his hand can also be 
the  video-image  of a similar, but alien hand. He must carefully compare his own internal 
representation of the action with the available visual feedback in order to detect possible 
mismatches (Nielsen, 1963). This paradigm was used to investigate the  performance of 
schizophrenic patients in attributing to themselves a token of action on the basis of a visual 
feedback that can be either veridical (what they see is their own hand) or spurious (they see a 
similar alien hand) (Daprati & al., 1997). This experiment included three conditions : the seen 
hand could be the subject's (condition I) or the experimenter's ; in the latter case, the movement 
of the alien hand could be identical to the subject's response (condition II) or not (condition III).
It was found that  normal subjects misjudged the alien hand as theirs in condition II only, in 
roughly 30 % of the cases, and never misattributed their own hand movement to the 
experimenter. Schizophrenic patients  had a  performance similar to normal subjects in condition I 
and III , but their error rate increased to 77% (for patients with hallucinations) and 80% (for 
patients with delusions) in  condition II. 
These results raise a set of new questions. First, how can one explain the contrasting results in 
conditions I and  II ? When a subject does a simple action such as raising one finger when 
hearing a tone, and watches a simultaneous action by the gloved hand, he must compare fine 
central or proprioceptive details of timing and kinematics  in the internal model of the movement 
effected with the visual cues  to detect who the agent is. Normal subjects fail occasionally, when 
the mismatch between cues lies below a certain threshold. This failure is consistent with the data 
gathered by Fourneret & Jeannerod reported above. Vision may win against proprioception and 
convince the subject that what he did was what he saw. Let us note however that the present 
task is explicitly one of detection, whereas the explicit task in Fourneret & Jeannerod was a motor 
performance with visual feedback (drawing a straight line). This difference in goal could account 
for the better performance of subjects engaged in detection. Not having to use the visual 
feedback for pursuing the task may help the subjects to focus on their own sensorimotor 
experience, however impoverished it may be.
It is interesting to note that  failure in normal subjects always consists in overattributing to 
themselves visual tokens of  movements  of the alien hand, never in denying that a movement 
was theirs. This asymmetry in the pattern of failures may be explained by claiming that the 
subjects are indeed conscious of having done the same type of movement as the one observed, 
have learnt to identify their movement in their peripheral space, and therefore are driven to adapt 
(within limits) their  visual experience to their  motor experience by neglecting the  possible 
mismatches.  (Still subjects with delusion of  control do have a slightly stronger tendency in this 
experiment  to incorrectly identify a gesture of their's as the experimenter's.)
The degraded performance of  schizophrenic patients relative to controls  in condition II needs  
to be accounted for. Why  would patients with hallucinations and delusions make respectively 77 
% and 80 % of agency misattributions to self, while other patients have a 50% rate of errors ? 
Several hypotheses come to mind, some of them explored in Daprati et al. (1997).  The simplest 
and most venerable is that the system fails to produce or to use a sufficiently strong copy of the 
efferent signal. In this view, the system fails to keep track of his own representation of the action 
as effected. For lack of such a signal, the organism fails to correctly anticipate the feedback that 
should occur as a consequence of the executed movement. What this hypothesis does not 
explain, though, is the asymmetry between the patients'performances in conditions I and II. The 
learning bias postulated above could again account for it. Also, this hypothesis fails to account 
for the fact that schizophrenics do not present problems at automatically correcting their own 
intentional movements in simple tasks. 
 A second general type of hypothesis, compatible with the first, consists in examining the 
relationship between sensorimotor representation and agency representation. Granted that a 
corollary discharge regulates the execution of an action and the extraction of the relevant 
feedback, one sees that this mechanism is purely "private", in the sense that it has to use 
egocentric coding : only in this way can a comparison be made between efference copy and 
reafferences. On the other hand, determining  who did  an action is a perceptual judgment made 
on the basis of public cues, represented in allocentric coding. To know that I am the agent of my 
actions, I  need to represent the goal, as well as the relevant visual features of a current action, 
and determine whether these correspond to any internal model. Although, as we saw, the 
sensorimotor representation of the action is not  consciously driving every step of the action, still 
some salient parts of the sensorimotor control of the action may be represented explicitly, in 
terms of the physical changes that occur in the world. The main evidence that I am the agent  in 
a particular action is that the relevant aspects of the environment and of  my body are 
successively felt to be affected in the planned way. If for some reason the world  around me was 
changing successively in exactly the way it would if I acted on it intentionally, while I am only 
forming intentions to act, I would have a hard time, in the absence of a plausible explanation, 
resisting the idea that I am acting on it. Thus it may not be so much internal as external cues - as 
predicted by an action plan - that have the main burden in agency judgments.
Thus it is  plausible that the schizophrenic patients have a specific difficulty  either in comparing 
egocentric with allocentric representations, or in using the  sequence of environmental cues to 
produce a conscious and verbally reportable agency judgment. Let us briefly explore these two 
routes.
It is a well established fact that schizophrenics have a specific deficit in integrating  multiple 
sources of information. In particular, they might have a specific difficulty at integrating 
proprioceptive and sensorimotor representations with visual inputs. Clinical reports on 
schizophrenics  frequently describe an egocentric perception of the outside world : patients tend 
to see people as similar to themselves in their physical appearance ; in verbal hallucinations they 
hear voices directed to themselves. In delusion of reference, they have the impression that 
unknown passers-by wish to communicate with them.  In a few cases, patients have distorted 
impressions concerning the boundaries of their own body  (Cutting, 1994). This perturbation in 
the egocentric-allocentric representation of states of affair may express a dramatically reduced 
ability to utilize contextual information in a task-relevant way (Cohen & Servan Schreiber, 1992; 
Silverstein, Matteson and Knight, 1996)). In this hypothesis, whatever the present task is, 
reception of familiar or egocentric information is facilitated, while those features of the 
environment that are novel or foreign tend to be ignored.  (Cohen and Servan-Schreiber  
suggest that variations of dopamine in the brain are responsible for these changes in gain). 
Such an explanation could account for the clinical cases in which patients with delusion 
misattribute to themselves actions of  other people, as well as for Daprati & al.'s results. In this 
view, agency attribution is taken to be a cognitive task that involves selecting relevant cues and 
balancing egocentric and allocentric sources of evidence. Now one difficulty is again to explain 
how these same patients may have normal performance in integrating  proprioception and visual 
data in other tasks and in dayly routines. As we saw earlier, Malenka & al. had shown that 
patients do indeed use visual feedback to correct their errors in motor performance, and  on the 
contrary seem unable to make the adequate corrections when they lack such visual feedback.
A way out of the difficulty , explored in Jeannerod (in press) consists in denying that the various 
agency tasks under consideration present the same cognitive demands.  Some are automatic : 
the adequate responses are either innate or overlearnt. The common feature in these automatic 
tasks is that they do not involve any specific control. They are stimulus-driven, and do not require 
any attentional resources. Some are controlled : in other words, they are either new or still to be 
learnt ; they cannot be executed without exerting a deliberate selection of inputs;  to succeed in 
these tasks, subjects have to keep in working memory the goal and subgoals of the action. Now 
it seems obvious that the agency attribution task in Daprati et al's experiment does belong to the 
latter category. Subjects cannot rely on familiar routines to respond correctly. They indeed have 
to find by themselves a strategy for detecting the agent.
An important finding  in this perspective is that, in schizophrenics, automatic processes (such 
as the inhibition of a blink reflex through presentation of a weak prestimulus) resist better to 
interference, while voluntary processes (such as pressing a key as soon as a checkerboard seen 
on a screen disappears) are more subject to interference than in normal subjects  (Callaway & 
Naghdi (1982). Dominey & Georgieff (1997)  show that schizophrenics do better, in a sequence 
learning paradigm, in learning the surface structure of sequences than in learning the abstract 
structure, which again indicates that their implicit learning is spared while their controlled, explicit 
processing  may be impaired. This contrast between automatic and controlled processing could 
account for the impaired agency attribution in  situations  demanding a high level of explicit 
processing. Agency judgments happen in a variety of contexts, the less natural being the 
experimental ones. Ordinarily, a subject does not have to ask himself explicitly whether he was 
the agent of an act. Still the information on who did what is critical for the success of any active 
perception, as well as for any action. This contrast between agency information and agency 
conscious attribution appears also in clinical data, where the schizophrenic patients seem to be 
considerably more disturbed in their conscious sense of agency than in their actual interaction 
with the world. 
In this view, altered conscious states in patients would not result from a general consciousness-
related deficit, but to local difficulties with processing cues relevant for identifying an action and 
retaining them in working memory. Thus they would not be primarily impaired in the processing of  
first-person information, but in what philosophers call aspectuality, i.e. the way in which the 
context is taken to be relevant and used for controlling one's action.
Self-consciousness,simulation  and the theory of mind : concluding remarks
In the present state of research on conscious agency attribution, there are still many questions 
to be answered, concerning in particular the  cerebral mechanisms for  agency attribution  that 
are impaired in the schizophrenic patients, and the difference between the impairments 
underlying respectively the delusion of influence (where the subject is not conscious of acting, 
but of being acted upon) and the delusion of control (where the subject believes that he can 
cause other people to act). One question raised earlier in this chapter needs to be explored 
again in light of the  preceding discussion. Is there any uniform notion of self-consciousness ? Is 
such a notion a product of metarepresentational abilities ?
Let us note that, even in those cases where patients attribute their own  acts to some external 
force, they  experience agency-deprivation in a first-person way. Similarly, a depersonalized 
patient reports having a feeling of depersonalization, or a patient with Cotard syndrom reports 
that he does not exist anymore. It seems paradoxical that a subject could retain a first-person 
experience of episodes that seem associated to no feeling at all.  One could submit that these 
states lie on a continuum with extreme cases where no first-person experience is present and for 
that very reason is not reported ( "negative" symptoms such as catatonia could raise this kind of 
problem). But this line of response fails to acknowledge what has been the main theme in this 
chapter. If there is a functional disconnection between conscious representation and 
unconscious information processing, then it is perfectly possible for someone to report abnormal 
qualia while not being impaired in processing automatically the corresponding stimuli. 
 The preceding discussion leads us to resist the view that reflexive conscious states would 
depend on the operation of some central mechanism generally responsible for 
metarepresentation.  Clearly, there are many different types of information that are used in the  
course of  an action to know  who did what (corollary discharge, parameters on movement 
velocity, body  vs target orientation, etc.). Among these, few can be directly made the content of 
a conscious experience. You don't feel in charge in the same direct way as you see a certain 
shade of green or as you feel a prick in your  finger.  Generally speaking,  an actor does not 
have access to his own central efferent signals. Agent-related conscious representations may be, 
in respect with their informational basis, distributed on several distinct functions, such as visual 
perception, proprioceptive and haptic processing, inferential capacities, and verbal 
representations. When he becomes conscious of acting, it must be, as we saw, on the basis of 
third-person accessible information.
A second important fact that emerged is that goal representation is self-other neutral. If goal 
representations are essentially sharable, then we do not understand other people by  projecting 
a piece of internal knowledge on to them, as often assumed. The problem which our brain has to 
solve is the converse problem : determining  who the agent is, once a goal is identified. This fact 
does not imply that we become conscious of "detached" goal representations. What it does 
imply, is that it is certainly possible to identify the goal of an action without specifying who the 
agent is. A corresponding intuition of this phenomenon is offered by a  type of mental imagery in 
which a pattern of movement is both visualized and effected mentally. This kind of simulation 
does not seem to call for an explicit representation of the agent. Mentally simulating an action in 
a first-person way, and looking at someone with the intention of imitating  his movement share 
important cerebral as well as phenomenological properties13. Simulation would in both cases 
appeal to the memory of a goal-directed action, and possibly carry with it part of the sensorimotor 
representation typical of the action. Such an ability, which seems denied to non-human animals, 
is the basis for craftsmanship, artistic and sport practices.
This view has interesting consequences on the theory of mentalization, i.e. on the explanation 
of what makes a human being able to attribute to others and to himself mental states such as 
believing and desiring. Here too it must be decided whether this ability develops as a whole, as a 
module coming to maturity around 4 years of age, or whether it results from the interaction of 
other independent subcapacities. Whereas as we saw, Frith's theory of schizophrenia invokes the 
impairment of a metarepresentational module, a view that Jeannerod seems to have adopted in 
some of his writings, the discussion above is compatible with another picture of the conscious 
attribution of mental states. The concept of simulation has been used  by philosophers14 to show 
that a theory of mind is not needed to attribute intentional states to others. According to this 
view, one can predict and explain each other's behavior by simulating the decision processes in 
the others as well as in oneself. Mental concepts such as  belief, desire, and agency, would in 
this analysis not precede, but result from actively simulating others entertain  goals and 
motivational states. Autistic children would be accordingly deprived of a theory of mind because 
they would have a primary trouble at simulating in the appropriate way the situation in which 
another is involved.  The preceding discussion brings  important additions to the simulation theory 
of mind, with the notion of the shared character of goal representations. One can plausibly 
speculate that observed action, with the simulatory component of action memory, form a major 
building block for an understanding of other minds. Metarepresenting, in this perspective, would 
depend on additional executive capacities for maintaining distinct the inferences from diverse 
simulated contexts of action. Simulating aspects of action and perception could thus give us a 
key to aspectuality and its disorders, i.e. those that seem to be instrumental in schizophrenia and 
in autism. 
---------------------
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